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Abstract
This thesis presents a model that simulates and solves power system dispatch problems utilizing
stochastic linear programming. The model features the ability to handle single period, multiple
bus, linear DC approximated systems. It determines capacity, energy, and reserve quantities
while accounting for N-1 contingency scenarios (single loss of either generator or line) on the
network. Market systems applying to this model are also proposed, covering multiple real-time,
day-ahead, and hybrid versions of consumer costing, transmission operator payment, and gener-
ator remuneration schemes. The model and its market schemes are applied to two test systems
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This section outlines the concept of reserves and their role as an ancillary service (A/S) in
electricity networks. Introducing this concept will be an overview of electricity networks and the
major regulatory agencies in North America that watch over their operation (including defining of
ancillary services). Since the Ontario system is simulated as a test system, its governing agencies
will also be reviewed. An overview of all recognized A/S will be given followed by an in-depth
examination of operating reserves, including different types, roles, and sources in the bulk electric
system. Issues pertaining to network security will be discussed at this time.
Concluding this technical glance of the electricity network will be an examination of the asso-
ciated market concepts, including dispatch methods (merit order, sequential, and simultaneous)
and various area pricing schemes.
1.1 Electricity Networks
The electric power system, in its most elementary form, is responsible for delivering energy in
the form of electricity from suppliers to consumers (supply and demand) through a network of
1
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transmission lines. Buses, which may be interchangeably referred to as nodes, are points in the
system where two or more elements connect. These elements consist primarily of generators,
loads, and transmission lines. Buses that are connected to generators (which supply electricity
to the system) are known as generator buses (supply nodes) and those connected to loads (which
consume energy from the system) are similarly called load buses (demand nodes). Buses that
are neither connected to generators nor loads may also exist. These generators, loads, and
transmission lines have a multitude of characteristics, a selection of which (those used in the
model) are discussed in Chapter 3.
1.2 N-1 Contingency
A system with N number of elements, all of which are operational, is said to be operating in
the ‘N’ state. A N-1 contingency occurs when any single element of the system is removed from
service (e.g. due to an equipment malfunction). The N-1 contingency criterion states that, in
this condition, the electric system should be able to remain secure and operational. This criterion
may be extended to encompass the failure of X number of elements, becoming ‘N-X contingency
criterion.’ [2]
The N-1 contingency criterion, encompassing generator and line outages, forms the basis for
the stochastic aspect of the presented model.
1.3 Regulatory Agencies
There are two major regulatory agencies that monitor and regulate the bulk electric power system
in North America: the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), whose domain covers
regions in Canada and the U.S.; and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, a U.S. agency.
1.3. REGULATORY AGENCIES 3
1.3.1 North American Electric Reliability Council
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) is a voluntary not-for-profit organiza-
tion whose mission is to ensure the reliable, adequate, and secure operation of the bulk electric
system within North America. To reach this goal, NERC establishes standards and guidelines
and subsequently monitors and enforces their adherence by member organizations. [3]
Ten regional reliability councils make up the members of NERC, whose members in turn
represent all sectors and interests in the electric industries, from governments to utilities. Con-
stituents of the Ontario electric system fall under the Northeast Power Coordinating Council
(NPCC) [4], discussed in section 1.3.3.
NERC is composed of multiple committees, subcommittees, and working groups who examine,
assess, and make policies or recommendations regarding specific areas within the bulk electric
system, including reserves.
1.3.2 Federal Energy Regulator Commission
The Federal Energy Regulator Commission (FERC) is the U.S. federal agency mandated to
oversee the “energy industries in the economic and environmental interest of the American public”
[5] with an outlook toward economic competition within these markets. Concerning the electrical
industry, FERC is responsible for the interstate transmission and sale of bulk electricity.
1.3.3 NPCC and IESO Overview and Responsibilities
The Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) is one of ten regional councils under the
auspices of the North American Electric Reliability Council. This council, of which Ontario is
a member, also encompasses Quebec and the Maritimes as well as a number of northeastern
American States. The NPCC, whose mission is to ensure a reliable interconnected power system,
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regularly conducts assessments of its members’ compliances to its standards and requirements,
imposing sanctions if necessary. [4] NPCC’s guides and policies follow those of NERC’s, with
specific requirements and augmentations as required.
In Ontario, market operation falls under the auspices of the Independent Electricity System
Operator. The IESO, who is a member of NERC and the NPCC, sets its standards according to
their guidelines and policies. In addition, the IESO sets all market related practices. [6]
1.4 Overview of Ancillary Services
Interconnected operations services (IOS) and ancillary services (A/S) have been defined, to a great
extent, by the NERC and FERC, respectively. Although their definitions and included services
may vary slightly depending on the issuing authority, the terms IOS and ancillary services can
be and are used interchangeably, with the latter the most dominant in the industry.
Responsible for the IOS is the IOS Subcommittee (IOSS), who is responsible for the devel-
opment and maintenance of definitions, policies, practices, and standards of all things regarding
IOS. [7] The details of such will be embodied as Policy 10 in NERC’s Operating Manual [1],
subject to approval.
In FERC’s Order 888, a document ordering “sweeping” changes to the electricity industry
regarding the unbundling of services, six ancillary services were recognized. In this document,
FERC ordered that these particular services be included in an open access transmission tariff.
Other services were recognized to exist, but were not identified in this document. [8]
In this section, IOS recognized by NERC will be the focus. NERC defines IOS as the “ele-
mentary ‘reliability’ building blocks from generation (and sometimes load) necessary to maintain
bulk electric system reliability”. [9] Moreover, they must be capabilities able to be deployed to
meet current and future reliability objectives.
1.4. OVERVIEW OF ANCILLARY SERVICES 5
The IOS reference document identifies six core IOS, so chosen because they are uniquely
measurable and have distinct impacts on system reliability criteria. Each of the services is also
affiliated with one of three corresponding reliability objectives, as listed below. [1]






• Bulk Transmission Reliability
– Reactive Power Supply from Generation Services
– Frequency Response
• Emergency Preparedness
– System Black Start Capability
Under the resource and demand balance objective falls the regulation, load following, and
contingency reserve (encompassing spinning and supplemental reserves) services. As the name
suggests, these services are responsible for ensuring that there is always enough supply to meet
moment by moment demand.
The second reliability objective, bulk transmission, is responsible for ensuring network (trans-
mission system) security. The IOS tasked under that objective are reactive power supply from
generation sources and frequency response.
Finally, under emergency preparedness falls system black start capability. This reliability
objective addresses the issue of restoring the bulk electric system in the event of a catastrophic
failure.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
As this thesis focuses on the deployment of reserves, the primary interest is in the first
reliability objective, resource and demand balance.
1.4.1 Operating Reserves
As specified in NERC’s operating policy 1, operating reserves must be “sufficient to account for
such factors as forecasting errors, generation and transmission equipment unavailability, system
equipment forced outage rates, maintenance schedules, regulating requirements, and load diver-
sity.” [9] These requirements are met through NERC’s listed IOS reserve services, detailed in
section 1.5.
There are multiple subcategories of operating reserves, each of which can be ordered by their
quality (where high quality corresponds to a short time to deployment). These reserves, in
descending order of quality, are frequency response, regulation, contingency reserve - spinning,
contingency reserve - non-spinning, and load following reserves. Typically higher quality reserves
can be used in place of a lower quality reserve, but at a cost. Table 1.1, itemizes the deployment
period of each reserve.
Load-serving reserves or backup supplies may also compose the operating reserve; however,
they are not identified as IOS as they do not support the reliability of the bulk electric system.
1.5 Resource and Demand Balance
Reiterating the previous section, the resource and demand balance reliability services are respon-
sible for ensuring that supply always matches demand. These services are comprised of a series
of reserves under the ‘operating reserves’ banner.
1.5. RESOURCE AND DEMAND BALANCE 7





Regulation X X X
Load Following X X
Post Contingency
Frequency Response <<
Contingency Reserve - Spinning X
Contingency Reserve - Non-Spinning X
1.5.1 Regulation and Load Following
During normal (non-contingency) operation of the bulk electric grid, demand will naturally de-
viate from forecasted loads. Since generation must always match demand, two interconnected
operations services are tasked to address these natural deviations: regulation and load following.
There are two different ‘types’ of normal (non-contingency related) deviations to which these
services are addressed, rapid fluctuations and trends in power demand. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
differences.
As illustrated in figure 1.1, the regulation service addresses small, unpredictable minute to
minute variations in demand. This is natural as consumers often turn on and off load with no
particular correlation. In contrast, the load following service addresses imbalances within a longer
period of time (the scheduling period - usually an hour) and compensates for large, predictable
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Figure 1.1: Load Following and Regulation [1]
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changes in demand. This may occur, for example, if a colder day than predicted occurs and
consumers gradually ramp up the heat.
Regulating reserves can be provided for by the same technology as spinning reserves, namely
automatic governor controls (AGC), with the difference being that generation reduction (reg-
ulation down) is required in addition to generation increases (regulation up). For a further
description of the AGC refer to the next section.
The same class of resources used to supply spinning, non-spinning, and regulating reserves,
in addition to other long term reserves, may be used to supply the load following reserves. For
further information on this, refer to the following sections.
1.5.2 Contingency Reserve
Purpose
Although contingencies are an ‘expected’ occurrence within the bulk electric system, especially
given the vast and interconnected systems currently operating within North America, they are
not part of normal system operation. They must, however, be prepared for and solutions readied
at all times. These contingencies can range from transmission line interruption (e.g. shorting
from lines touching brush) to transformer or generator failures.
In the event of a significant contingency, power delivery may be restricted from one area to
another (in the event of a line failure), or a power source may be cut out entirely (in the case of a
generator failure). Following such possibilities, generation must be replaced and/or redistributed
across the grid. This is usually done by the system operator calling upon selected contingency
reserves to be activated.
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Definition
Contingency reserves are classed into two categories: spinning and non-spinning. Spinning re-
serves are broadly defined as unloaded capacity, spinning and synchronized to the grid, fully
available to the system (i.e. to take on full load) within 10 minutes of being called upon.
Non-spinning reserves encompass generation capacity not connected (or synchronized) to the
grid that can be called up within 10 minutes to supply power. This category of reserve may also
include any load reduction capacity available to the system operator within 10 minutes. The
model presented in Chapter 3 does not differentiate between spinning and non-spinning reserves.
Specific contingency reserve requirements differ between operators belonging to different re-
gional reliability councils. The most common requirement, however, is usually some formulation
requiring enough reserve to cover at least the single largest possible contingency. In some cases it
may be specified by the council as a percentage of load (typically around 7%) or it may be left up
to the system operator to calculate [10] [11]. The model later presented uses the more complex
N-1 contingency criterion.
Provision
The provision of spinning reserve capacity by a generator may be attained through changing the
set points of its automatic governor control. Figure 1.2 is a simple representation of a generation
system and will be used to illustrate the AGC’s operation.
The majority of power is generated by turbines driven by steam or water, which in turn drives
a synchronous generator thus injecting AC power into the system (represented in the figure as
‘load’). The governor is a device forming the feedback loop from the turbine shaft to the steam
or water input. In essence, it is one method of controlling the frequency and magnitude of the
power generated.


























Figure 1.3: Droop Curves and AGC Operation
There are two adjustable ‘characteristics’ associated with the governor: the droop curve and
the set point. The droop curve, lines S1 and S2 in figure 1.3, is involved with frequency response
(the details of this are beyond the scope of this research). However, the AGC is also responsible
for automatic adjustments of the governor set, which shifts the droop curve either up or down.
Figure 1.3 illustrates this shifting.
This can be used in the provision of reserves. Given an order to increase real power output
from P0 to P1, the governor set points must be changed from S1 to S2. This will maintain a
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constant frequency of f0 but result in a change of power, P1 - P0. These set points are also
representative of generator loading, for example S1 maybe equivalent to 60% load and S2 to 95%.
Spinning reserve requirements may also be met though generators connected and spinning
but with their turbines un-clutched. Given instructions to supply generation, the turbine can be
clutched to the generator, providing synchronized, added capacity [12].
Non-spinning reserves may be provided by equipment not synchronized to the system, for
example, thermal units that are ‘not started but ready’, in addition to generators capable of
providing spinning reserves. Furthermore, loads that can be directed to cut their consumption by
a specified amount may also be considered under this category. As non-spinning reserves typically
take longer to react, they can be regarded as a lower quality source of contingency reserves than
spinning.
Costs
The provisioning of all operating reserves (load following, regulation, or contingency) incurs an
opportunity cost to the generator. This is the loss of net revenues by not being able to supply the
power to the energy markets, as it must be held in reserve. Typically, this would be the market
energy price, minus maintenance and fuel costs.
1.6 Dispatch Methods
In competitive markets, the dispatch of contingency reserves is often determined in tandem with
that for meeting energy demands. Given a competitive pool market involving these services, there
are three principal methods by which dispatch may be determined: merit-order-based dispatch,
sequential dispatch, or joint (simultaneous) dispatch [13]. These different systems each have
trade-offs between higher co-ordination and greater reliance on private markets [14].
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1.6.1 Merit Order
Under merit order dispatch the markets for each product (i.e. energy and reserve) are operated
separately and independently of one another. Bidders submit their price/quantity pairs to the
appropriate product market, where the operator ranks and selects (dispatches) them based on
merit (lowest cost first). Since each product is treated as entirely separate (though both energy
and reserves share a generator’s capacity), dispatch solutions may be neither optimal nor even
feasible [13].
1.6.2 Sequential
In a sequential dispatch system, energy and reserves are recognized as sharing generator capacity.
Suppliers submit their price/quantity bid pairs to the market operator who pools then together
and then sequentially assigns resources, based on bid price, to required services in order of priority
(from high to low). These service requirements, ordered from highest to lowest priority, are energy,
regulating reserves, spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves, load following, and backup support.
As each product is dispatched, the available capacity in the pool is reduced.
The benefit of this market form is that it is voluntary in nature and is thought to promote
market efficiency while avoiding the gaming prevalent in centralized (i.e. simultaneous) dispatch
methods [14]. The setbacks of this method include not knowing the best trade-offs for sharing
limited resources and capacity. Furthermore, since each market is operated separately, prices for
lower quality reserves may exceed those for higher quality reserves, leaving little incentive to bid in
the higher quality market. This may result in insufficient allocation of resource to higher priority
requirements (such as spinning reserves) while lower quality services (such as load following) may
be over-served [15] [16].
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1.6.3 Simultaneous (Joint) Dispatch
The simultaneous method assigns resources to system requirements simultaneously, imitating the
structure of vertical operations (those seen before deregulation) [14]. Each service is assigned
resources within the same consolidated market where higher quality resources can be applied to
lower quality services. Essentially, this method is treated as a constrained optimization problem,
leading to economic and secure solutions to system needs [16]. This integrated system receives
its gains from tighter co-ordination resulting in stronger system reliability.
This dispatch system has superior pricing than the sequential system, with prices accurately
reflecting the opportunity cost of scarce resources. Furthermore, it is more likely to assign re-
sources such that all energy and reserve are met than the sequential dispatch method. Unfortu-
nately, its complex and ’black-box’ solution and assignment algorithms are vulnerable to gaming
by participants within the system [14]. The proposed dispatch model takes the simultaneous
dispatch approach.
1.7 Nodal, Uniform, and Zonal Pricing
Three methods are used for assigning pricing in market systems: uniform marginal pricing (UMP),
zonal marginal pricing (ZMP), and nodal marginal pricing (NMP). UMP, used in such markets
as the UK, Ontario, and Sweden, assigns a single price uniformly across all nodes in the system.
In ZMP schemes, used in Norway and Denmark, one price is assigned to nodes within a zone (a
set of nodes), but prices may vary from zone to zone. Finally, in NMP, used in Argentina and




In addition to the fundamentals on energy networks and market structure outlined in the intro-
duction, a review of literature more closely pertaining to the topic of this thesis is given. The
areas of research reviewed in this section are pricing of energy and reserve under various market
structures, dispatching of reserves in deterministic settings, and the optimal allocation of reserves
in a stochastic environment. While the former sports a significant quantity of research, less is
available on the latter.
2.1 Pricing of Energy and Reserves
Alaywan et al. [14] present a detailed comprehensive AC (non-linear) model for simultaneous
auction electricity markets. Through the use of its Lagrangian, they define marginal prices of
energy and various ancillary services, including regulation, and spinning reserves. Although
applied to a non-linear program, the concept used by Alaywan et al. is similar to the application
of duals to find prices in the linear program of Chapter 3.
In Arroyo and Galiana [19], the nodal marginal pricing of energy and multiple reserve types
15
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in a detailed simultaneous market are also explored. Two major claims are made by the authors:
local reserves should not be pre-specified but remain as decision variables within the constraints;
and that there are no differential prices between different types of reserves. This approach, of not
pre-specifying reserves, is similar to Chapter 3’s method of using the N-1 contingency criterion to
determine reserve quantities. Although alike in this manner, Arroyo and Galiana do not include
reserve energy costs within the objective function, which is done in the proposed model and other
literature, as introduced below.
2.2 Deterministic Dispatching of Reserves
The concept of using a market structure that dispatches energy reserves in consideration of its
probability of use is established in Singh [20]. In his paper, Singh describes a single period, one
bus system whereby there is a separate auction for each reserve type. Each reserve auction is
settled through a cost minimization function, which considers each participant’s reserve capacity
bids and reserve energy bids (the cost of turning the reserve into energy). Paired with each energy
bid is also a probability factor - the likelihood of the reserve being called to use. The function is,
of course, subject to the usual maximum output and minimum required quantity constraints.
Singh analyzes three different methods with which the ISO may choose to run the reserve
auction. These methods involve assigning the probability of reserve energy utilization to 0, 0 to
1, or 1. Setting probability to 0 forces bids to be ranked based solely on capacity bids, which has
the added effect of mitigating gaming. Determining and assigning probabilities between 0 and 1
can be used to pursue a true cost minimization solution. Finally, setting probability to 1 gives
an estimation of the maximum payments.
Rashidinejad et al. [21] also propose a single period, one bus system that concerns itself
with the probability of reserve energy utilization. However, unlike with Singh’s, dispatch of
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reserves is jointly determined with energy dispatch (simultaneous dispatch). Two frameworks of
optimization are presented, one based solely on bids and the other on costs. The authors conclude
that, compared to merit order and sequential dispatch, joint energy and reserve dispatch is the
most economic and secure. This thesis uses this apporach and expands on it by introducing
stochastic, multiple bus systems.
2.3 Stochastic Modelling of Contingencies
Bouffard et al. [22], in a recent conference paper, cite two drawbacks of using deterministic models:
(1) required constraints may be unachievable and (2) social welfare may not be optimized. In their
paper they use stochastic programs in presenting a multi-period, networked model, considering
generation energy, reserve, reserve energy costs, demand benefit, and value of expected load not
served (ELNS) in their objective function. The latter, ELNS, represents value lost from load
shedding. Since the proposed model is multi-period, unit commitment issues are integrated,
including ramp up/ down rates from pre-contingency to post-contingency states. In their second
accompanying paper [23], where the model was applied to two test systems, it was shown that
there are “potential economic benefits of a stochastic market-clearing formulation through the
optimization of the expected costs of reserve deployment and involuntary load shedding” [23].
They also identify possible issues and solutions to solving such extensive optimization problems.
Chapter 3
Model Description
The purpose of this model is to mathematically describe a single period, multiple bus, simultane-
ous dispatch electrical system using linear programming (LP) techniques. This model expands on
the technique, using the probability of reserve usage in allocating dispatch quantities, first used
by Singh [20] and then by Rashidenejad et al. [21]. In the prior models the probability of using
reserves from each generator was known; however, in this model such data is not predetermined
and may only be calculated from the output of the model. Instead, this model uses stochastic
programming in determining reserve usage while adhering to the N-1 contingency criterion. Com-
pared to the model to be presented, Bouffard et al. [22] present a more realistic, multi-period
model that is faithful to real constraints and costs. On the otherhand, the model of this thesis is
more similar to market LP’s and pays more attention to markets, pricing, and risks, as described
in Chapter 5.
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3.1 Nomenclature
All nomenclature used in describing the model and the accompanying market schemes follow be-
low. These include the sets and indices used in distinguishing different nodes/buses and scenarios,
the parameters and variables used in the linear program, and the auxiliary variables that are later
used to describe the market system. Caution should be taken when interpreting symbols as they
are formulated using an economics (as opposed to electrical) point of view. Since the length of
the planning period is one hour, unit costs, energy prices, and marginal values are measured in
$/MWh.
3.1.1 Sets and Indices
s: scenario (sεS)
ŝ: base scenario (most probable, no contingencies)
S: set of scenarios
i, j: node (i, jεN)
N : set of nodes in network
3.1.2 Parameters
πs: % probability of scenario s,
∑
sεS πs = 1
Aei : offer price of energy at node i ($/MWh)
Ari : offer price of reserve at node i ($/MWh)
Adi : marginal value of demand at node i ($/MWh)
M ci : generator i capacity (MW)
Mdi : load i forecast demand (MW)
Bij : line susceptance between ij (Ω
−1)
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fij : line capacity between ij (MW)
Uijs: binary defining line existence and availability (Uijs = 1)
and/or non-existence or unavailability (Uijs = 0) for scenario s
χis: availability of generator i, scenario s; 0 ≤ χis ≤ 1; outage fraction = 1 − χis
λi: fraction of demand, M
d
i , that cannot be shed
3.1.3 Variables of Optimization Model
qci : capacity dispatch from node i (MW)
qeis: energy dispatch from node i for scenario s (MW)
qris: reserve dispatch from node i for scenario s (MW)
qdis: energy demand at node i for scenario s (MW)
θis: voltage angle at node i for scenario s (rad)
αx: dual variable for primal constraints (3.1)-(3.6) respectively, x = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
α1i: marginal value of capacity at i ($/MWh)
α2is: marginal value of energy at i for scenario s ($/MWh)
α3ijs: marginal value of line capacity (i, j) for scenario s ($/MWh)
α4is: marginal value of capacity allocated in stage 1 at i for scenario s ($/MWh)
α5is: marginal value of forecast demand at i for scenario s ($/MWh)
α6is: marginal value of minimum demand at i for scenario s ($/MWh)




αxis: probability removed dual used for pricing, x = 3, 4, 5, 6 ($/MWh)
peis = α̇2is =
1
πs







sεS α2is: expected energy price at i ($/MWh)









is): expected payment to generator i ($)
p̂ei : energy price at i ($/MWh)





is): expected value of q
x
is, x = e, r, c, d (MW)
ΠXis : generator i profit in scheme X for scenario s ($)
Π̄Xi : generator i expected value of profit in scheme X ($)
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3.2 Model
The model in its entirety, to aid in examination, is presented below. A description of each







































Bij(θis − θjs) = 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α2is) (3.2)
Bij(θis − θjs) ≤ fij ∀sεS, ∀iεN (α3ijs) (3.3)





i = 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α4is) (3.4)
qdis ≥ λiM
d
i ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α5is) (3.5)
qdis ≤ M
d
i ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α6is) (3.6)
(Variable Sign Restrictions)
qci ≥ 0 ∀iεN (3.7)
qeis ≥ 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (3.8)
qris ≥ 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (3.9)
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3.3 Model Description
The market system model is composed of two parts, the objective function, (3.0), and constraints,
(3.1) to (3.9), described in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively.
3.3.1 Objective Function
Under the premise of this market system the ISO will take, from each generator at node i, offers
of energy and reserve at price Aei and A
r
i respectively, and a maximum quantity, M
c
i , that the
sum of energy and reserve cannot exceed. Following established procedures, the ISO estimates
the marginal value of demand, Adi at each demand node i, and the probability of each scenario πs.
This value, also known as the ‘value of lost load,’ has been the subject of numerous studies and
is usually higher than cost and market value. The ISO then chooses, for each possible scenario
s and all nodes i, the quantity of energy, qeis, and reserves, q
r
is, to be dispatched, along with the






is, are chosen in such a way as
to maximize the expected value of social welfare (i.e., minimize expected costs offset by consumer


























While maximizing social welfare, the objective function takes into consideration all single
contingencies in addition to the base case, where nothing goes wrong. In this model a single
contingency means the complete failure of one element, either a generator or a line.
3.3.2 Constraints
This section is divided into first and second stage constraints. The first stage constraints, (3.1),
correspond to decisions in the day-ahead market. The second stage constraints, (3.2)-(3.6),
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model real-time operation of the network for the base case and all contingency scenarios. For
each constraint, a dual variable is denoted by (α) with subscripts 1-6. The first stage variables,












i ∀iεN (α1i) (3.1)
The total capacity (energy plus reserve), qci , that a generator will be required to supply in
a day’s time is restricted by the maximum capacity of the generator, M ci , submitted as part
of the generator’s offer package. The quantity, qci , being dispatched in advance, is independent
of any scenario that may play out in real-time. In the proposed market system, this will alert
the generator to the total quantity of energy or reserve (or combination thereof) that must be
provided in real-time. Note that at this point in time (day-ahead), qci is not differentiated between
energy and reserve.









Bij(θis − θjs) = 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α2is) (3.2)
Bij(θis − θjs) ≤ fij ∀sεS, ∀iεN (α3ijs) (3.3)





i = 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α4is) (3.4)
qdis ≥ λiM
d
i ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α5is) (3.5)
qdis ≤ M
d
i ∀iεN, ∀sεS (α6is) (3.6)
In the second stage, all possible scenarios (encompassing the base and all single contingency
scenarios) that could occur in real-time are solved (in consideration of the objective function).
Thus, for any given scenario that does play out in real-time, feasible quantities will have been
determined and will be ready for dispatch to generators (or from loads, in the case of shedding).
The network is represented by a lossless, second order DC approximation, (3.2), used by
Fuller [17], Hogan [24], and many others. This equation enforces, for every scenario, network
load flows and supply and demand matching. It takes Bij , the susceptance of line (i, j), as
parameters. The voltage angles, θis, vary accordingly depending on load flow in or out of node i.
Note that the summation only includes nodes j such that the line (i, j) exists and is not removed
from service for the scenario in question, i.e. Uijs = 1.
Network line flow limits are enforced by (3.3), with each in-service line (i, j) having a maximum
carrying capacity of U(i, j). An outage on any given line (i, j), for any scenario, s, is simulated
by assigning its binary Uijs = 0, therefore removing the corresponding inequality (in (3.2) and
(3.3)) from the model.
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By definition, the sum of a generator’s energy and reserve product must equal the total
capacity dispatched by the ISO to the generator in the day-ahead decision, as in (3.4). If a
contingency (either complete or, in the case of larger stations, partial) occurs on a generator at
bus i, in any given scenario s, its capacity will be reduced to the fraction χis of maximum dispatch
capacity, qci , where 0 ≤ χis ≤ 1. This equality is modeled in (3.4). A single contingency, as
dictated by the N-1 contingency criterion, is represented by either forcing a line outage, Uijs = 0,
or generator outage, χis < 1.
In order to accommodate scenarios where it is impossible to meet all forecasted demand, M di ,
a variable demand is introduced. This demand has a maximum (ideal) value of M di , the forecast,
and a minimum amount, λiM
d
i , that must be met in all scenarios, where 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1. These
limits on demand, qdi , are enforced by (3.5) and (3.6) and set by the system operator. In essence,
this constraint defines a minimum load that cannot be shed and a remaining load, defined as
‘sheddable,’ that can be dropped in emergencies. To prevent load shedding in non-emergency
situations (the norm), a significantly high value to consumers, Adi , is introduced into the objective
function. As signified by the bus index i, this value can vary by node, which may be the case
when comparing rural loads to that of a city’s downtown core. Bouffard, et al [22] substantially
explore this area in detail, including security, expected load not served, and its value.
The sign restrictions of variables are as follows:
qci ≥ 0 ∀iεN (3.7)
qeis ≥ 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (3.8)
qris ≥ 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (3.9)
The voltage angles, θis, are unrestricted in sign.
Chapter 4
Dual Model
The dual form of the model is shown below to facilitate discussions in Chapter 5 on market
schemes. Since the susceptance line parameter is independent of line flow, the equality Bij = Bji






























χisα4is ≤ 0 ∀iεN (q
c
i ) (4.1)
α2is + α4is ≤ πsA
e





i ∀iεN, ∀sεS (q
r
is) (4.3)
−α2is + α5is + α6is ≤ −πsA
d







Bij(−α2is + α2js + α3ijs − α3jis) = 0 ∀iεN, ∀sεS (θis) (4.5)
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α1i ≤ 0 (4.6)
α3ijs ≤ 0 (4.7)
α5is ≥ 0 (4.8)
α6is ≤ 0 (4.9)
Both α2is and α4is are unrestricted in sign.
4.1 Complementary Slackness
To assist in proofs developed in the next chapter, complementary slackness is applied to (3.1),
(3.5)-(3.6), and (4.1)-(4.4), leading to the following expressions:










































This chapter proposes multiple schemes that can be used in the design of a market when applying
the model described in Chapter 3. The approaches introduced in this chapter comprise consumer
costing, transmission operator payment, and generator compensation schemes. Besides defining
the energy and reserve pricing and quantities of each scheme, economic characteristics such as
expected profit and variance of profit will be detailed, with a benefit analysis of each.
All schemes are derived from the dual model and/or complementary slackness conditions of
the model from Chapter 4, starting with use of the strong duality property [25], which states that,
given an optimal solution, the objective functions of the primal and dual can be equated. By
equating (3.0) and (4.0), and shifting the supply-related terms to the left-side and demand-related
terms to the right, the basis for a possible market design forms.
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i , on the left side, form the basis for








with transmission owner payments. All terms on the left are non-negative due to (3.8), (3.9),












i ), form the basis
for consumer costs. The first, second, and third terms in the summation on the right are non-
negative, non-negative, and non-positive, respectively.
Examining these terms suggests real-time or expected value consumer cost, transmission op-
erator payment, and generator compensation schemes. In this thesis, proposed schemes will
center on real-time, day-ahead, and hybrid generator remuneration schemes; however, real-time
and day-ahead schemes for consumer costing and transmission operator payment will also be
examined.
All schemes presented are based, at least partially, on the expected value of related real-
time variables. This research assumes that any expected value, over all scenarios, equals the
long-run average that would be observed over time when the same day-ahead marked conditions
are repeated. However, short run disparities between income from consumers and payments to
generators and the transmission operator implies that, in the real world, the market operator
would be required to keep a buffer or reserve to ensure continued payouts.
All pricing schemes contain or relate to the probability-removed dual, ˙α2is = α2is/πs of (3.2),
henceforth referred to as peis.
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5.1 Consumer Costs
This section introduces two consumer payment schemes for goods and services (transmission,
energy, and reserves) rendered to the consumer. The two payment schemes are real-time or
expected value derivations of the right (consumer-cost side) of (5.1). Although energy may be
seen as the only ‘good’ from a consumer point of view, both transmission network use and reserves
are necessary services that must be paid for. Since they are all equated to the left (resource-side)
of (5.1), these schemes will cover the expected value of all costs encountered by the network.
5.1.1 Real-time
Energy cost to load i: peis × q
d
is
The real-time consumer payment at node i, when the state of the world is as in scenario s, is
the real-time price times the real-time quantity consumed, where the price is the dual of (3.2).
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By Theorem 5.1.1, the expected value of total consumer payments equals the right (consumer
costs) side of (5.1); thus this scheme provides a feasible cost recovery method. As previously
noted, although payments from the consumer may not match generator and transmission owner
compensation in the short run, they are expected to be equal in the long run, i.e. have equal
expected values.
The cost per unit of energy is (from the proof of Theorem 5.1.1)
peis = α̇2is = A
d
i + α̇5is + α̇6is (5.2)
However, since α̇5is 6= 0 and α̇6is 6= 0 are mutually exclusive, as constraints (3.5) and (3.6)
cannot both be active, and α̇5is ≥ 0 and α̇6is ≤ 0, p
e
is will be non-positive in cases where A
d
i is not
sufficiently high to offset α̇6is. Hence, although p
e
is is normally positive, A
d
i < |α̇6is| will result in
a negative price for that scenario. If in the rare case there is a negative price, it would be the
result of problems distributing power and its persistence would suggest making improvements to
the network.
5.1.2 Day-ahead













This pricing schedule is based on expected values: costs are assessed to the individual demand
nodes based on the expected state of the network for the hour under consideration. Loads pay
the expected costs of their node for their consumption, regardless of the specific consumption and
price that happen in real-time. Unlike the real-time schedule, there is no variance in payments
from the consumer for any given hour.
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5.2 Transmission Owner Compensation
Two methods of compensating transmission network owners, as suggested by the transmission
terms of (5.1), are covered in this section: real-time and day-ahead.
5.2.1 Real-time






This is a real-time scheme; payments are made to the transmission operator based upon
the actual state of the system for the hour in question. According to complementary slackness
conditions on (3.3), payments to the transmission operator occur with line congestion. This
payment should act as a signal to expand network capacity on the affected lines.
5.2.2 Day-ahead








This scheme is similar to that of real-time, except that it pays the transmission network
operators the expected value of the real-time payments (over all scenarios).
5.3 Generator Compensation
The various generator compensation mechanisms, the focus of this chapter, are based on three
different approaches. These approaches differ in the timing that their prices are rooted upon: pure
real-time, pure day-ahead, and hybrid (a combination of the previous two). All of the schemes,
except for day-ahead scheme B (explained later), have the same expected value of revenue and
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Table 5.1: Generator Payments for Schemes with Explicit Energy Prices
Energy Reserve
Scheme




Day-Ahead B p̄ei q̄
e
i − −




















































































profit. Summaries of each scheme and their characteristics are provided in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and
5.3.
Table 5.1 details the quantities and prices charged for energy and reserves delivered by gener-
ators for those schemes that carry explicit energy and reserve prices. Table 5.2 details the total
payments made for energy and reserves delivered by generators for those schemes that do not
carry explicit energy and reserve prices, as well as subsets of those schemes in table 5.1 that,
under certain conditions, bear no explicit prices.
Table 5.3 summarizes all the major economic characteristics of the generator compensation
schemes. Economically, there are two important criteria for establishing a successful market:
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Table 5.2: Generator Payments for Schemes with Integrated Payment
Scheme Payment Notes
Day-Ahead A pei q
e
i




















































































Table 5.3: Summary of Generator Payment Scheme Characteristics
Variance of Profit for i Obeys Accounts for Explicit Explicit
Scheme



































2 N/A No No No
































2 Yes2 No Yes2 Yes
Hybrid E 0 N/A Yes No No
Hybrid C-HY 0 No Yes Yes1 Yes
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sufficient revenue to cover all costs, and pricing at or above marginal cost for any generator that
supplies energy. The latter is referred to as the ‘pricing rule’ in the table, with the former being
met for all schemes except day-ahead B. Variance of profit, also indicated in this table, is a
measure of risk.
Each scheme is discussed below in detail.
5.3.1 Real-time Generator Pricing
In this real-time pricing scheme, compensation to generators is based solely on the scenario that
occurs in the hour under consideration, i.e. the actual state of the system. Although providing a
payment for energy, peis, there is no explicit payment for reserves. This is not uncharacteristic of
markets, as reserves are not routinely seen as a ‘product’ by consumers.
Payment to generator i for energy: peisq
e
is
This scheme satisfies both of the criteria important for establishing a market: sufficient revenue
and the pricing rule.
Theorem 5.3.1. Under real-time pricing, for each generator i, the expected revenue will equal






















































































This theorem states that a generator providing energy capacity (in the form of either energy
or reserves) can expect to, at a minimum, break even (if not make a profit).
The next theorem states that the price of energy supplied by a generator is equal to or greater
than the marginal cost of energy for that generator, i.e. the price for energy supplied is greater
than or equal to the difference between the cost of energy and the cost of reserve. This marginal
cost is identified in stage two, when the state of the world is known. Capacity dispatch. qci , is fixed,



























Thus, the marginal cost of generation in stage two is Aei − A
r
i .





when qeis > 0.
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Proof.
α2is + α4is = πsA
e
i from (4.2)
∴ α2is − πsA
e
i = −α4is ≥ −πsA
r from (4.3)










Theorem 5.3.2 allows prices to be low enough, in some scenarios, that a generator cannot
recover all of its costs from producing energy and reserves. However, Theorem 5.3.1 ensures that
all costs are covered in the expected value (long-run average) sense.






































Compensation schemes based on day-ahead pricing consider only the expected state of the sys-
tem for the time period in question, regardless of what the actual state of the system ends up
being. Obviously, all schemes in this category have the drawback of not paying for any real-time
variations in dispatch. Four schemes, A, B, C, and D falling under the day-ahead category are
presented.
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Scheme A









In this scheme, compensation is the expected value of the real-time payment. There is no
explicit price for energy, nor, like the previous real-time method, is there an explicit payment for
reserves.












The expected profit, Π̄A, is identical to the real-time scheme, −α1iq
c


















Payment to generator i: p̄ei q̄
e
i
This scheme is an extension of the one used in Bouffard, et al [23], where price is based on
p̄ei , the expected value of the dual of the real-time price. Extending this concept further, total
compensation is the product of expected price and expected quantity delivered.






i . It could be that for a
generator providing reserves in many scenarios, peis and q
e







i , with the difference being the value of reserves. Because of this drawback, this scheme
will not be further explored. Rather, based on this thinking, the next scheme presented includes
a payment for reserves.
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Scheme C
If q̄ri > 0,
Payment to generator i for energy: p̄ei q̄
e
i












Else if q̄ri = 0,
Payment to generator i: pei q
e
i
Scheme C has two alternatives, contingent on whether the average quantity of reserve dis-
patched, q̄ri , is zero or greater than zero. If q̄
r
i > 0, this scheme presents two distinct prices: one
for energy and one for reserve. The price of energy, p̄ei , is non-negative but, as in scheme B, may
violate the pricing rule of Theorem 5.3.2 that is normally expected of any market. Reserve price,




is are positively correlated, and negative if p
e
is and
qeis are negatively correlated. The latter could arise with the failure of a very large generator
significantly reducing qeis and thus causing a price spike in p
e
is. Negative reserve prices can be
interpreted as a built-in correction for the overpayment of energy supplied that may occur.
When q̄ri = 0, an integrated payment is made to the generator for energy supplied, identical to
that of scheme A, thus meeting the sufficient revenue requirement and pricing rules. Regardless,
profit, expected profit, and the variance of profit are identical to that of day-ahead scheme A.
The next scheme, D, modifies this scheme to reduce the likelihood of violating Theorem 5.3.2’s
pricing rule, by taking the energy price and quantity from the most probable (base) scenario, ŝ.
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Scheme D
If qriŝ > 0,
Payment to generator i for energy: peiŝq
e
iŝ













Else if qriŝ = 0,
Payment to generator i: pei q
e
i
Like scheme C, there are two possible subsets used for pricing: qriŝ > 0 and q
r
iŝ = 0. In the first
subset, which makes payments based on the most probable scenario, ŝ, both sufficient revenues
and pricing rules (Theorems 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, respectively) are met. However, this scheme does not
entirely eliminate infractions of the pricing rule, with such instances possibly occurring within







Finally, since this scheme uses the most likely scenario rather than expected values for pricing
and quantity, it may benefit from being more understandable to producers who operate and plan
based on ‘likely’ scenarios - it is similar to some existing markets.
5.3.3 Hybrid Generator Pricing
Hybrid compensation schemes are composed of both real-time and day-ahead pricing components.
In this section three are presented: E, which is derived from the left side of (5.1); and C-HY and
D-HY, which are variations of the day-ahead schemes C and D with added real-time adjustments,
commonly referred to as ‘constrained on/off’ payments. All hybrid schemes have the advantage
of zero variance and therefore no risk.
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Scheme E
Advance day-ahead payment to generator i: −α1iq
c
i
Payment to generator i for energy: Aei × q
e
is
Payment to generator i for reserve: Ari × q
r
is
This scheme is derived from the generation terms on the left of (5.1), modified by (4.10). It
includes a payment in advance and real-time compensation for actual energy and reserve delivered
by the generators.
The advance payment may be viewed as a guaranteed profit to generators regardless of what
the real-time state of the world ends up being. The value α1i can be non-zero only if the generator
is called upon to provide full capacity (qci = M
c
i ). Thus, this advance payment can be considered
an incentive for ‘at capacity’ generators to expand. Generators are always compensated for the
cost of energy and reserve delivered; thus they will never lose money for delivery of such goods.
The drawback of this method is that no explicit market price for either energy or reserve can
be made, since the ISO contracts with each generator separately.





If q̄ri > 0,
Payment to generator i for energy: p̄ei q̄
e
i
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Else if q̄ri = 0,
Payment to generator i: pei q
e
i









This scheme is identical to that of scheme C except for the constrained on/off adjustment.
The adjustment is made in real-time and compensates generators for producing more energy or
reserve than expected while penalizing for producing less (energy or reserve) than expected, by
the amount Aei or A
r
i , respectively, per unit.
The profit per scenario is
ΠC−HYs = Π





















i ) are zero, the expected profit remains
the same as for C. The major benefit of this scheme over that of the original day-ahead scheme
C is the generators’ variance in profit being reduced to zero.
5.3.5 Scheme D-HY
If qriŝ > 0,
Payment to generator i for energy: peiŝq
e
iŝ



































Else if qriŝ = 0,
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Similar to C-HY, D-HY complements day-ahead scheme D with a constrained on/off adjust-











used to preserve the expected profit seen in all schemes (except B).
The profit per scenario, with no variance, is
ΠD−HYs = Π













Two test systems are used with the model to verify and examine its applicability and that
of the accompanying market system. The first test system is a small network containing six
buses; the second is a much larger system containing 66 buses, representing Ontario’s electrical
system. The examples will illustrate the model’s resource and demand allocation and the payment
and compensation schedules for loads, transmission operator, and generators. To solve the two
systems, the model and each system’s network and market data were first coded into GAMS
programs, included under appendix A, and solved on a UNIX workstation using the CPLEX
solver.
6.1 6-bus Test System
6.1.1 Description
The 6-bus test system used in this example has been modified from the test system used in [17].
These changes were necessary to ensure that there was sufficient data (particularly pricing) to
apply the model and to ensure feasibility, especially during contingencies. This model is for one
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Figure 6.1: 6-Bus Test System
Table 6.1: 6-Bus Test System - Generator Data





1 113 8 4
2 167 2 0.5
3 82 21 16
hour and assumes constant flows over the hour (for example, a load with a 1 MW demand will
consume 1 MWh of energy over the hour). The network configuration of the test system is shown
in figure 6.1.
This system consists of three generators (nodes 1, 2, and 3), three loads (nodes 4, 5, and
6), and eleven transmission lines, all of whose characteristics are in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3,
respectively.
The 6-bus system features three generators of largely varying capacities (between 82 MW and
167 MW) and marginal (incremental) costs ($2 to 21/MWh for energy and $0.5 to 16/MWh for
reserve). Demand also varies significantly between loads, with forecasted consumption between
30 and 80 MWh. The variable, M di , is the maximum (forecasted) energy consumption level;
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Table 6.2: 6-Bus Test System - Load Data





4 80 40 1500
5 30 15 1500
6 62 31 1500
Table 6.3: 6-Bus Test System - Transmission Line Data
Node i Node j Bij(Ω
−1) Capacity (MW)
1 2 4.00 65
1 4 4.71 60
1 5 3.11 55
2 3 3.85 35
2 4 8.00 70
2 5 3.00 40
2 6 4.45 45
3 5 3.17 20
3 6 9.62 50
4 5 2.00 50
5 6 3.00 30
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Table 6.4: 6-Bus System - Scenarios
Scenario Element Removed Probability of Occurrence
1 N/A (Base) 95%
2-4 Generator 0.2% (each scenario)
5-15 Line 0.4% (each scenario)
λiM
d
i is the minimum consumption level. For this example, the same fraction of non-sheddable
load, λi = 0.5, was used for all loads. Transmission lines are, as always, bi-directional between
points ij, with susceptance Yij = Yji. Line capacity was chosen such that, under some scenarios,
congestion would occur. The details of each scenario are outlined in table 6.4.
There are a total of 15 scenarios: 1 base scenario (where all elements are working) and 14
single contingency scenarios. Of the contingency scenarios, 3 cover all possible single genera-
tor outages and 11 cover all possible transmission line outages. The base scenario has a 95%
chance of occurrence, with 0.2% and 0.4% for each generator and line outage, respectively. These
probabilities are arbitrarily assigned.
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6.1.2 Results
The following set of tables (6.5 to 6.18) detail the consumer cost, transmission payment, and
generator compensation schemes of chapter 5 when applied to the 6-bus test system. The first
set, tables 6.5 and 6.6, deal with consumer real-time and day-ahead costing schemes.
Examining table 6.5, it is seen that the real-time scheme has a large variance in costs, ranging
from $3.95-4.57/MWh in the base scenario to $1500/MWh (the marginal value of demand, Adi )
in scenario 3. Consumption within each load does not vary between scenarios except when its
cost of energy is at the marginal value of demand, at which point it is more economical to shed
load. For reference, the $1500/MWh cost correlates to absolute cost of $60,000 24,000 and 93,000
in scenario 3 compared to $315, 128 and 283 in scenario 1 for loads 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
This method of pricing may not be palatable to consumers, who may shy away from seeing a
$1500/MWh charge on their bill, regardless of energy’s long time average value. The day-ahead
scheme in table 6.6 alleviates this problem.
The costs in the day-ahead scheme are much more muted compared to those of possible real-
time costs, being above the base case but much lower than the maximum charge. Table 6.7,
details payments to the transmission operator for congestion. Similar to the consumer scheme,
payments in real-time have large variance. For stability in payments, the system operator may
prefer to receive the day-ahead amount.
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Table 6.5: 6-Bus System - Real-Time Consumer Costs













4 1 80 316 3.95 9 69.18 103,771 1500.00
5 1 30 129 4.30 9 30 17,744 591.48
6 1 62 283 4.57 9 62 43,248 697.54
4 2 80 56,836 710.45 10 80 259 3.24
5 2 30 21,313 710.45 10 30 251 8.37
6 2 62 44,048 710.45 10 62 618 9.97
4 3 40.00 60,000 1500.00 11 80 16,009 200.12
5 3 16.00 24,000 1500.00 11 30 23,651 788.37
6 3 62 93,000 1500.00 11 49.71 74,556 1500.00
4 4 80 259 3.24 12 80 320 4.00
5 4 30 251 8.37 12 30 120 4.00
6 4 62 767 12.36 12 62 248 4.00
4 5 80 336 4.20 13 80 259 3.24
5 5 30 111 3.70 13 30 251 8.37
6 5 62 239 3.86 13 62 1,686 27.19
4 6 75.88 111,827 1500.00 14 80 312 3.90
5 6 30 7,785 259.49 14 30 131 4.36
6 6 62 6,810 109.84 14 62 284 4.59
4 7 80 323 4.04 15 80 317 3.96
5 7 30 133 4.45 15 30 127 4.24
6 7 62 287 4.63 15 62 288 4.64
4 8 80 259 3.24
5 8 30 251 8.37
6 8 62 1,031 16.64
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Table 6.7: 6-Bus System - Transmission Operator Payments
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Tables 6.8 to 6.16 detail the application of all generator compensation schemes (except day-
ahead B) to the 6-bus system. Their profits and variances are shown in tables 6.17 and 6.18.
Besides detailing prices and compensation to generators, table 6.8 lists the dispatch quantities
of energy and reserves for all scenarios. Under the base scenario, dispatch of energy and reserve
is as what is expected: the cheapest generator is used to capacity in providing energy, with the
second and third supplying the necessary remaining energy. The bulk of reserve is provided by
generator 2, the second cheapest provider of reserve after 1 (which is already at full capacity).
The largest price spikes are seen in scenarios 2 and 3 when generators 1 and 2, respectively, are
removed from the system. In the latter scenario, load must be shed in order to maintain system
security.
Day-ahead schemes A, C, and D, as shown by tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11, respectively, have
identical total payments. Unlike A, schemes C and D have explicit prices for energy and reserve.
In scheme C’s scenario 2, there is a negative reserve price, however, the net payment is still
the same. Scheme D’s generator compensation prices are all non-negative, avoiding the negative
prices seen in C.
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Table 6.8: 6-Bus System - Real-Time Generator Compensation























1 1 3.90 109.10 4.00 15.60 9 54.70 58.30 4.00 218.81
2 1 167.00 0 3.83 639.47 9 101.48 65.52 1.50 152.22
3 1 1.100 3.90 5.00 5.50 9 5.00 0 1052.59 5,262.95
1 2 - - 710.45 - 10 45.03 67.97 4.00 180.13
2 2 167.00 0 710.45 118,664.62 10 121.97 45.03 1.50 182.95
3 2 5.00 0 710.45 3,552.23 10 5.00 0 1052.59 71.96
1 3 113.00 0 1500.00 169,500.00 11 113.00 0 287.68 32,507.82
2 3 - - 1500.00 - 11 41.7 125.29 1.50 62.57
3 3 5.00 0 1500.00 7,500.00 11 5.00 0 1721.92 8,609.61
1 4 11.43 101.57 4.00 45.74 12 5.00 108.00 4.00 20.00
2 4 160.57 6.43 1.50 240.85 12 167.00 0 4.00 668.00
3 4 - - 18.64 - 12 0.00 5.00 4.00 -
1 5 21.09 91.91 4.00 84.38 13 84.36 28.64 4.00 337.45
2 5 149.28 17.72 1.50 223.93 13 87.64 79.36 1.50 131.46
3 5 1.62 3.38 5.00 8.10 13 0.00 5.00 4.60 -
1 6 97.22 15.78 4.00 388.87 14 4.42 108.58 4.00 17.69
2 6 65.67 101.33 1.50 98.50 14 167.00 0 3.84 641.03
3 6 5.00 0 113.28 566.41 14 0.58 4.42 5.00 2.89
1 7 0.25 112.75 4.00 1.00 15 2.66 110.34 4.00 10.64
2 7 167.00 0 3.96 660.70 15 167.00 0 3.86 645.33
3 7 4.75 0.25 5.00 23.75 15 2.34 2.66 5.00 11.69
1 8 34.76 78.2 4.00 136.06
2 8 132.27 34.8 1.50 198.35
3 8 5.00 0 14.59 72.95
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Table 6.10: 6-Bus System - Day-Ahead C Generator Compensation






i (MW) Payment ($)
1 9.54 5.80 4.06 106.97 489.54
2 8.17 164.78 -257.12 1.89 859.93
3 20.99 1.20 16.00 3.79 85.85
Table 6.11: 6-Bus System - Day-Ahead D Generator Compensation






iŝ (MW) Payment ($)
1 4.00 3.90 4.34 109.10 489.54
2 5.15 167.00 0 0 859.93
3 5.00 1.10 20.60 3.90 85.85
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Tables 6.12 and 6.13 detail the real-time and advance generator payments, respectively, of
hybrid scheme E. Total payment to the generator is the advance plus the real-time compensation
for the occurring scenario. As predicted, advance payments are made to generators 1 and 2, who
are running at capacity.
Table 6.14 details the results of hybrid scheme C-HY and tables 6.15 and 6.16 detail hybrid
scheme D-HY. In order to keep expected values static, the payments before adjustments for D-HY
will differ from the day-ahead D payments. After adjustment, the expected values of the total
payments are identical to the other schemes.
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 provide a summary of all the generation compensation schemes. Gen-
erator profit is presented in table 6.17, with the maximum, minimum, and base scenario profits
given for each scheme. The benefit of the hybrid schemes is best seen here, where profit will
remain positive regardless of the scenario playing out. As expected, variances decrease in the
order of real-time, day-ahead, and hybrid schemes, as detailed in table 6.18.
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Table 6.12: 6-Bus System - Hybrid E Generator Compensation (Real-Time)
Payment Payment Payment
Generator Scenario








Aei qise + A
r
i qisr($)
1 1 436.40 6 840.87 11 904.00
2 1 334.00 6 182.00 11 146.07
3 1 85.50 6 105.00 11 105.00
1 2 - 7 453.00 12 472.00
2 2 334.00 7 334.00 12 334.00
3 2 105.00 7 103.75 12 80.00
1 3 904.00 8 591.06 13 789.45
2 3 - 8 281.85 13 214.96
3 3 105.00 8 105.00 13 80.00
1 4 497.74 9 670.81 14 469.69
2 4 324.35 9 235.72 14 334.00
3 4 - 9 105.00 14 82.89
1 5 536.38 10 632.13 15 462.64
2 5 307.43 10 266.45 15 334.00
3 5 88.10 10 105.00 15 91.69
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(MW) (MW) Adjustment ($) ($)
Sc
(MW) (MW) Adj ($) ($)
1 1 -1.90 2.13 -6.71 482.83 9 48.90 -48.67 196.50 686.04
2 1 2.22 -1.89 3.50 863.43 9 -63.30 63.63 -94.78 765.15
3 1 -0.10 0.11 -0.35 85.50 9 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00
1 2 -5.80 -106.97 -474.32 15.22 10 39.23 -39.00 157.81 647.35
2 2 2.22 -1.89 3.50 863.43 10 -42.81 43.14 -64.05 795.88
3 2 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00 10 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00
1 3 107.20 -106.97 429.68 919.22 11 107.20 -106.97 429.68 919.22
2 3 -164.78 -1.89 -330.50 529.43 11 -123.07 123.40 -184.43 675.50
3 3 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00 11 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00
1 4 5.63 -5.40 23.42 512.96 12 -0.80 1.03 -2.32 487.22
2 4 -4.21 4.55 -6.15 853.78 12 2.22 -1.89 3.50 863.43
3 4 -1.20 -3.79 -85.85 0 12 -1.20 1.21 -5.85 80.00
1 5 15.29 -15.06 62.06 551.60 13 78.56 -78.33 315.14 804.67
2 5 -15.49 15.83 -23.07 836.86 13 -77.14 77.47 -115.54 744.39
3 5 0.42 -0.41 2.26 88.10 13 -1.20 1.21 -5.85 80.00
1 6 91.41 -91.19 366.56 856.10 14 -1.38 1.61 -4.63 484.91
2 6 -99.11 99.44 -148.50 711.43 14 2.22 -1.89 3.50 863.43
3 6 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00 14 -0.62 0.63 -2.95 82.89
1 7 -5.55 5.78 -21.31 468.23 15 -3.14 3.37 -11.67 477.87
2 7 2.22 -1.89 3.50 863.43 15 2.22 -1.89 3.50 863.43
3 7 3.55 -3.54 17.90 103.75 15 1.14 -1.13 5.85 91.69
1 8 28.96 -28.73 116.74 606.28
2 8 -32.54 32.88 -48.65 811.29
3 8 3.80 -3.79 19.15 105.00
∗ Day-ahead plus real-time
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Table 6.15: 6-Bus System - Hybrid D-HY Generator Compensation (Before Adjustments)






iŝ (MW) Payment ($)
1 4.00 3.90 4.28 109.10 482.83
2 5.17 167.00 0 0 863.43
3 5.00 1.10 20.51 3.90 85.50
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(MW) (MW) Adjustment ($) ($)
Sc
(MW) (MW) Adj ($) ($)
1 1 0 0 0 489.54 9 50.80 -50.80 203.21 692.75
2 1 0 0 0 859.93 9 -65.52 65.52 -98.28 761.65
3 1 0 0 0 85.85 9 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35
1 2 -3.90 -109.10 -467.60 21.93 10 41.13 -41.13 164.52 654.06
2 2 0 0 0 859.93 10 -45.03 45.03 -67.55 792.38
3 2 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35 10 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35
1 3 109.10 -109.10 436.40 925.93 11 109.10 -109.10 436.40 925.93
2 3 -167.00 0 -334.00 525.93 11 -125.29 125.29 -187.93 672.00
3 3 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35 11 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35
1 4 7.53 -7.53 30.13 519.67 12 1.10 -1.10 4.40 493.93
2 4 -6.43 6.43 -9.65 850.28 12 0 0 0 859.93
3 4 -1.10 -3.90 -85.50 0.35 12 -1.10 1.10 -5.50 80.35
1 5 17.19 -17.19 68.77 558.31 13 80.46 -80.46 321.85 811.39
2 5 -17.72 17.72 -26.57 833.36 13 -79.36 79.36 -119.04 740.89
3 5 0.52 -0.52 2.61 88.45 13 -1.10 1.10 -5.50 80.35
1 6 93.32 -93.32 373.27 862.81 14 0.52 -0.52 2.08 491.62
2 6 -101.33 101.33 -152.00 707.93 14 0 0 0 859.93
3 6 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35 14 -0.52 0.52 -2.60 83.24
1 7 -3.65 3.65 -14.60 474.94 15 -1.24 1.24 -4.96 484.58
2 7 0 0 0 859.93 15 0 0 0 859.93
3 7 3.65 -3.65 18.25 104.10 15 1.24 -1.24 6.20 92.05
1 8 30.86 -30.86 123.45 612.99
2 8 -34.76 34.76 -52.15 807.78
3 8 3.90 -3.90 19.50 105.35
∗ Day-ahead plus real-time
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Table 6.17: 6-Bus System - Generator Profit, For Selected Scenarios




Minimum Profit -452 -84 -80
Maximum Profit 168,596 118,311 8,505
Base Scenario (ŝ) Profit -452 305 -80
Day-Ahead A, C, D
Minimum Profit -414 526 -19
Maximum Profit 490 860 86
Base Scenario (ŝ) Profit 22 526 0
Hybrid E, C-HY, D-HY
Min = Max = Base Scenario (ŝ) Profit 15 529 0
Table 6.18: 6-Bus System - Variance of Generator Payment Schemes
Expected
Variance of Profit Π
Generator Profit ($) Real-Time Day-Ahead A, C, D Hybrid E, C-HY, D-HY
1 15 61,046,866 2,863 0
2 529 27,805,004 572 0
3 0 535,964 25 0
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6.2 Ontario Test System
6.2.1 Description
The Ontario test system is adapted from data used by the IESO to simulate Ontario’s electricity
network on a small scale; it is a scaled down, 66 bus version of the full system [26] for one
historical hour. It is composed of 53 loads, 171 transmission lines, and 12 generators. The
marginal value of demand for each load is the same for all, $1500/MWh. Transmission line limits
are set realistically, but not necessarily correct. A description of each generator’s details is given
in table 6.19.
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Table 6.19: Ontario System - Generator Data





1902 Fossil (Gas/Oil) 2140 61.1 16
2901 Nuclear 3524 3.75 0.5
2962 Nuclear 2064 3.74 0.5
4000 TS 8257 4 -
4905 Fossil (Coal) 1140 28 4
6308 Hydro 1290 1 0
6328 Fossil (Coal) 3920 28 4
6902 Nuclear 3076 3.75 0.5
6906 Nuclear 3140 3.75 0.5
7920 Fossil (Coal) 1975 28 4
8110 TS 1479 4 -
9103 TS 773 1 -
The generator data includes the type, capacity, and prices for each unit. Type and capacity
were both gathered through sources in the public domain [27], [28]. Marginal costs were realisti-
cally assigned based on marginal cost studies [29]; although not exact (as these costs are not in
the public domain), they are realistic for the generator type. Generator types include nuclear,
hydro, and fossil (oil, natural gas, and coal). Generators designated TS are regarded as aggregate
nodes - nodes that don’t represent a single generator but a small area of the larger network.
These TS generators have been assigned costs arbitrarily and are deemed to be always active,
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but incapable of providing reserve.
There are 181 scenarios: the base scenario, 9 single generator contingencies (all except the TS)
and 171 single line outage contingencies. The base scenario has a 95% probability of occurrence,
with the remaining scenarios splitting the other 5%: 0.015% per single generator outage scenario
and 0.0285% per single line outage scenario.
70 CHAPTER 6. EXAMPLES
6.2.2 Results
A selection of results from applying the market scheme to the Ontario system is presented in
tables 6.20 to 6.23.
Real-time consumer costs, presented in table 6.20, vary significantly, even being negative in
some scenarios. However, base prices remain reasonable as well as expected costs (used in the
day-ahead system).
Again, similar to consumer costs, payments appear much more reasonable when the trans-
mission expected (day-ahead) payments of table 6.21 are used.
Examining the generator pricing schemes of table 6.22, it is clear that hybrid scheme D-HY
provides the best approach. Both energy and reserve prices are very reasonable compared to the
largely varying amount seen in real-time, yet it also avoids the negative reserve prices contained
in C-HY. The benefits of the hybrid schemes, in general, is further proved by their low variance,
as seen in table 6.23.
6.2. ONTARIO TEST SYSTEM 71
Table 6.20: Ontario System - Consumer Costs, For Selected Loads
Load Real-Time Cost Expected
(Label) Min ($) Max ($) Base Scenario ($) Base Sc ($/MWh) Cost ($)
1 -49,961 719,890 11,645 23.29 12,988
100 5,758 750,000 11,645 23.29 13,390
101 2,657 348,632 5,413 23.29 6,392
103 1,981 300,000 4,658 23.29 5,289
344 3,374 450,000 6,987 23.29 8,311
359 -9,615 450,000 6,987 23.29 8,147
1001 -79,241 600,000 9,316 23.29 10,433
1104 2,221 300,000 4,658 23.29 5,523
1106 3,161 600,000 9,316 23.29 11,010
1301 2,229 300,000 4,658 23.29 5,512
2002 -6,552 1,050,000 16,303 23.29 18,781
2007 1,950 900,000 13,974 23.29 16,084
2100 2,275 1,050,000 16,303 23.29 18,900
2106 1,950 900,000 2,241 3.74 2,640
3107 4,901 900,000 13,974 23.29 16,263
3108 5,012 900,000 13,974 23.29 16,602
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Table 6.21: Ontario System - Transmission Payments
Real-Time Payment Expected
Min ($) Max ($) Base ($) Payment ($)





















Table 6.22: Ontario System - Generator Pricing, For Selected Generators
Price ($ /MWh) at Generator (Label)
Scheme
1902 2901 2962 4000 4905 6308 6328 6902 6906 7920 8110 9103
Real-Time
Miniumum peis 0 0 0 -49.54 8.17 1.00 0 0 0 0 -80131.92 -50.28
Maximum peis 2924.35 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00 1500.00
Base peiŝ 23.29 3.25 3.74 23.29 23.29 23.29 23.29 23.29 23.29 23.29 23.29 23.29
Day-Ahead C and Hybrid C-HY
Base p̄ei 28.53 3.97 3.97 26.75 27.32 27.02 26.93 26.25 26.25 27.19 4.00 27.23
Base p̂ri 0 -345.87 -262.55 - 4.00 -484.19 0 -343.63 -750.76 11.49 - -
Day-Ahead D and Hybrid D-HY
Base peiŝ 0 3.75 3.75 26.75 23.29 26.80 0 26.03 26.03 27.17 4.00 27.23
Base p̂ri 0 0 0 - 4.15 0 0 0 0 0 - -
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Table 6.23: Ontario System - Variance of Generator Payment Schemes






($ × 103) A, C, D E, C-HY, D-HY
1902 0 0 0 0
2901 0 831,751.5 78.4 0
2962 0 6,563.3 31.2 0
4000 171.9 273,493,197.8 0 0
4905 0 5,207,387.4 3,186.4 0
6308 33.3 7,711,312.0 0.7 0
6328 0 0 0 0
6902 68.5 36,120,111.8 60.2 0
6906 70.0 37,640,229.0 40.4 0
7920 0 3,613,655.0 400.5 0
8110 0 1,635,228,333.0 0 0
9103 12.4 1,216,887.9 0 0
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis presents a model that can be used for electrical energy and reserve markets, utilizing
stochastic linear programming. Its primary feature is its ability to take into consideration single
generator or line contingencies when determining optimal dispatch. Multiple pricing structures
are presented, each with its own sets of advantages and disadvantages. However, given the benefits
of generator hybrid schemes C-HY and D-HY (explicit prices for energy and reserves and zero
variance) and reasonable results from simulating the test cases, either scheme is an excellent
candidate for further development and study.
7.1 Suggestions for Further Research
1. Integrating a more complex AC, lossy network and multi-period market to the model (and
efficient algorithms to solve the model in a decent amount of time)
2. Analyzing market power issues introduced in this model
3. Comparative analysis of market dispatch with and without contingency consideration in
the objective function (i.e. model only feasibility of contingencies, not their costs).
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i buses / 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 /
is(i) supply buses / 1, 2, 3/
id(i) demand buses / 4, 5, 6/;
Set
s n-1 scenarios /1*15/;
* 1 Base Scenario
* 3 Generator Outages



























* Fraction of demand that cannot be shed
Parameter Ad;
Ad = 1500;
* Marginal value of demand
*-----------Lines------------
Table B(i,j) susceptance of the line
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 4.00 4.71 3.11





Table F(i,j) line capacity
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 50 55 50






Parameter Chi(s,is) generator scenarios









































4.3 1 / ;
Parameter U(s,i,j) line scenarios











15.5.6 1 / ;















15 0.004 / ;
Variables
snb social welfare ($)
81
t(s,i) theta at bus i (voltage angle in radians);
Positive variables
qp(is) quantity of energy capacity reserved (pre-dispatched)
qe(s,is) quantity of energy dispatched at is (MW)
qrc(s,is) quantity of reserve capacity dispatched at is (MW)
qd(s,id) quantity of energy demanded at id (MW);
Equations
welfare define objective function
poweralloc(is) power allocation
* ==simultaneous==
powerflows(s,is) supply node balance - realtime
powerflowd(s,id) demand node balance - realtime
powerflowe(s,i) neither a demand or node bus balance - realtime
limit(s,i,j) line power transfer limits d1 - realtime
genlimit(s,is) generator maximum output - realtime
dminlimit(s,id) demand lower limit
dmaxlimit(s,id) demand upper limit
swingdef(s,i) swing bus definition;
*Model
welfare.. snb =e= sum(s, sum(is, pi(s)*Ae(is)*qe(s,is)))
+ sum(s, sum(is, pi(s)*Arc(is)*qrc(s,is)))
- sum(s, sum(id, pi(s)*Ad*(qd(s,id)-(QdVar*QdMax(id)))));
*-------First Stage-------
poweralloc(is).. qp(is) =l= GenMax(is) ;
*-------Second Stage-------
powerflows(s,is).. qe(s,is) =e= sum(j$((F(is,j)>0 or F(j,is)>0) and not
(U(s,is,j)=1 or U(s,j,is)=1)),(B(is,j)+B(j,is))*(t(s,is)-t(s,j)))*100;
powerflowd(s,id).. -qd(s,id) =e= sum(j$((F(id,j)>0 or F(j,id)>0) and not
(U(s,id,j)=1 or U(s,j,id)=1)),(B(id,j)+B(j,id))*(t(s,id)-t(s,j)))*100;









































*ignored in U=1 cases... because if line’s down there is no connection (so theta’s don’t matter)
limit(s,i,j)$((F(i,j)>0 or F(j,i)>0) and not (U(s,i,j)=1 or U(s,j,i)=1))..
((B(i,j)+B(j,i))*(t(s,i)-t(s,j)))*100
=l= (1-U(s,i,j)-U(s,j,i))*(F(i,j)+F(j,i));
genlimit(s,is).. qe(s,is) + qrc(s,is) =e= (1-Chi(s,is))*qp(is);
dminlimit(s,id).. qd(s,id) =g= QdVar*QdMax(id);
dmaxlimit(s,id).. qd(s,id) =l= QdMax(id);
swingdef(s,’1’).. t(s, ’1’) =e= 0;
Model network /all/;






option iterlim = 100000;














alpha2c(s,i)$((not is(i)) and (not id(i))) = powerflowe.m(s,i);
Parameter alpha2cc(s,i);


































































*put ’Obj Value and q(ip)’//;
*put ’Objective Value: ’ welfare.l/;
put ’Gen, M_i, qp(is), alpha1’/;





put ’2D varaibles - Is’//;
put ’Scenario, Bus, qe(is), qrc(is), Ae, Arc, theta(is), M_i, Chi(is), ScenPr, Alpha2a, Alpha2ac’/;
loop(s, loop(is, put s.tl, ’,’ is.tl, ’,’ qe.l(s,is), ’,’ qrc.l(s,is), ’,’ Ae(is), ’,’ Arc(is) ’,’





put ’2D varaibles - Id’//;
put ’Scenario, Bus, QdVar, Ad, Qdmax, Qdmin, qd, theta(id), ScenPr, Alpha2, Alpha2c, Alpha5, Alpha5c,
Alpha6, Alpha6c’/;
loop(s, loop(id, put s.tl, ’,’ id.tl, ’,’ QdVar, ’,’ Ad, ’,’ QdMax(id), ’,’ QdMin(id), ’,’
qd.l(s,id), ’,’ t.l(s,id), ’,’ Pi(s), ’,’ alpha2b(s,id), ’,’ alpha2bc(s,id), ’,’





put ’2D varaibles - I’//;
put ’Scenario, Bus, theta(i), ScenPr, Alpha2, Alpha2c’/;








put ’s, i, j, line usage, line capacity, theta(i), theta(j), U(sij), Pi(s), alpha3, alpha3c’/;
loop(s, loop(i, loop(j$((F(i,j)>0 or F(j,i)>0) and not (U(s,i,j)=1 or U(s,j,i)=1) and
limit.l(s,i,j) > 0), put s.tl, ’,’ i.tl, ’,’ j.tl, ’,’ limit.l(s,i,j), ’,’ limit.up(s,i,j), ’,’
t.l(s,i), ’,’ t.l(s,j), ’,’ zed(s,i,j), ’,’ Pi(s), ’,’ alpha3(s,i,j), ’,’ alpha3c(s,i,j)/;)));
loop(s, loop(i, loop(j$((F(i,j)>0) and not (U(s,i,j)=1 or U(s,j,i)=1)
and (limit.l(s,i,j)=0 or limit.l(s,j,i)=0 )), put s.tl, ’,’ i.tl, ’,’ j.tl, ’,’ limit.l(s,i,j), ’,’
limit.up(s,i,j), ’,’ t.l(s,i), ’,’ t.l(s,j), ’,’ zed(s,i,j), ’,’ Pi(s), ’,’ alpha3(s,i,j), ’,’
alpha3c(s,i,j)/;)));
loop(s, loop(i, loop(j$((F(i,j)>0 or F(j,i)>0) and (U(s,i,j)=1)), put s.tl, ’,’ i.tl, ’,’ j.tl, ’,’







put ’s, Gen, alpha4, alpha4c’/;
loop(s, loop(is, put s.tl, ’,’ is.tl, ’,’ alpha4(s,is), ’,’ alpha4c(s,is)/;));
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